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ABSTRACT
This paper quantitatively evaluates the hypothesis that deﬂation can account for much of
the Great Depression (1929-33). We examine two popular explanations of the Depression:
(1) The “high wage” story, according to which deﬂation, combined with imperfectly ﬂexible
wages, raised real wages and reduced employment and output. (2) The “bank failure” story,
a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hd e ﬂationary money shocks contributed to bank failures and to a reduction
in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation, which in turn reduced lending and output. We
evaluate these stories using general equilibrium business cycle models, and ﬁnd that wage
shocks and banking shocks account for a small fraction of the Great Depression. We also ﬁnd
that some other predictions of the theories are at variance with the data.
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The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Many economists argue that deﬂation can account for much of the Great Depression
(1929-33) in the United States. According to this story, a sharp decline in the money supply
caused rapid deﬂation, which in turn reduced output. Empirical research has documented
large decreases in money, prices, and output between 1929-33. But there is much less work
assessing whether this shock can plausibly account for the Depression within fully articulated
general equilibrium models. This paper quantitatively evaluates the deﬂation hypothesis with
dynamic, general equilibrium business cycle models.
Evaluating the deﬂation hypothesis with general equilibrium models requires an ex-
plicit theory of why deﬂation reduced output so much in the 1930s. Since there are several
explanations for this in the literature, we ﬁrst narrow the ﬁeld by requiring that any success-
ful deﬂation theory of the Depression also be consistent with macroeconomic activity during
other major deﬂations. We therefore determine which deﬂation theories satisfy this criterion
by comparing the Great Depression to macroeconomic activity during the early 1920s, which
is a period of comparable deﬂation, but a much less severe downturn in economic activity.
We ﬁnd that two of the four most popular explanations are ruled out by this consistency
criterion. These are the “surprise deﬂation story” of Lucas and Rapping (1969), which argues
that the Great Depression was severe because the deﬂation was unexpected, and the “debt-
deﬂation” story of Irving Fisher , which argues that the Great Depression was severe because
deﬂation substantially raised the real value of private debt. The two stories that are not
ruled out are the “high wage story” and the “banking story.” According to the high wage
story, deﬂation, combined with imperfectly ﬂexible wages, raised real wages and reduced
employment and output. A number of economists report evidence in favor of this story,
including Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Bernanke and Carey (1996), and Bordo, Erceg, and
Evans (2000). According to the bank failure story, deﬂationary money shocks contributed to
bank failures and to a reduction in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation, which in turn
reduced lending and output. Bernanke (1983) reports evidence in favor of this story.
Following this empirical analysis, we develop two general equilibrium models to sep-
arately evaluate the wage shock hypothesis and the banking shock hypothesis. We ask two
questions: Can these shocks drive down output per adult nearly 40 percent relative to trendbetween 1929-33? Are the other predictions of the theories consistent with the data?
Our main ﬁnding is that wage shocks and banking shocks account for a small fraction
of the Great Depression. We also ﬁnd that some other predictions of the theories are at
variance with the data. We conclude that these results raise questions about the deﬂation
and banking hypothesis as an explanation of the Great Depression in the United States.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the comparison between the
Great Depression and the 1921-22 depression, and the evaluation of the four popular deﬂation
stories for the Great Depression. We then go on to develop general equilibrium models for
the two stories that are not ruled out by this comparison - the high wage story and the
banking story. Section 3 presents a general equilibrium model with above-market wages, and
also presents a quantitative assessment of the wage hypothesis. Section 4 presents a general
equilibrium model with an intermediation sector to assess the macroeconomic impact of bank
failures. Since our results support neither the wage nor banking story, section 5 brieﬂyd i s c u s s
two other possible contributing factors to the Great Depression: changes in asset prices and
changes in productivity. Section 6 presents a summary and conclusion.
2 .A nE m p i r i c a lP u z z l ea b o u tt h eD e ﬂation Hypothesis
A successful theory of the Great Depression based on deﬂation should account for
macroeconomic activity during 1929-33 and should also be consistent with macroeconomic
activity during other major deﬂations. This section empirically evaluates this consistency
requirement by comparing changes in prices and real output during 1929-33 to those during
a period of comparable deﬂation: 1920-22.
Table 1 shows the percentage change in the GNP deﬂator, real GNP, real consumption,
and real investment during these two episodes. The three quantity variables are deﬂated by
their speciﬁcd e ﬂators, are measured relative to the adult (16 and over) population, and
are detrended.1 Deﬂation is similar during these two periods: the price level fell about 20
percent between 1920-22, and also fell about 20 percent between 1929-32. Despite these
1We detrended these three quantity variables at a rate of 1.9 percent per year. We deﬁne this rate as
normal growth, because it is the growth rate of output/adult both before the Great Depression (1919-1929),
and after WWII (1947-1997), and because it is close to the 2 percent average growth rate between 1900-1997.
It is also worth noting that output/adult in 1929 is very close to an OLS trend line ﬁt to this series between
1900-1997. This suggests that output was close to its normal trend value in 1929.
2similar deﬂations, however, output fell much more between 1929-32 than between 1920-22.
Real GNP fell 36 percent between 1929-32, but just 4 percent between 1920-22.
T h e s ed a t ar a i s eap u z z l ea b o u tt h ed e ﬂation hypothesis: If the 20 percent deﬂation
of the 1930s caused the Great Depression, why didn’t the 20 percent deﬂation of the 1920s
also cause a major depression? Resolving this puzzle requires ﬁnding some other shock(s)
that magnify the depressing eﬀects of deﬂation and that were present in the 1930s, but not
in the 1920s. There are a several stories for why the 1930s deﬂation had such large, negative
real eﬀects. But can these stories explain why the Great Depression was so much worse than
the 1921-22 Depression? We address this question in the next section.
Table 1: Deﬂation and Output - Output and its Components2
Depression of 1921-22 (1920=100) The Great Depression (1929=100)
Year P Y C Fixed I Year P Y C Fixed I
1921 85.2 93.9 102.4 86.1 1930 97.5 86.9 90.0 73.2
1922 80.6 96.2 102.7 114.4 1931 88.5 77.6 84.3 48.5
1932 79.5 64.0 74.3 26.7
1933 77.5 60.9 70.8 23.0
A. Can the Standard Stories Explain the Severity of the Great Depression?
Four popular deﬂation stories for the Great Depression are: (1) the deﬂation was
unexpected, (2) nominal debt levels were high, (3) nominal wages were imperfectly ﬂexible,
and (4) there were many bank failures in addition to the deﬂation. We consider each of these
stories in turn and ask whether they might be consistent with both the Great Depression
and the 1921-22 Depression. For each story, this consistency requires that the shock that
magniﬁed the real eﬀect of deﬂation in the 1930s not be present in the 1920s.
2The price level is from Romer (1988) for 1921-23, and from Historical Statistics for 1929-33. The output
data for 1920-22 are from Kendrick (1961), p. 294. Romer (1988) argues that the Kendrick series is a better
output measure for the 1920s than the Commerce Depatment measure, which is based on preliminary work
of Kuznets and Kendrick. The output data for 1929-1933 are from the NIPA. The population data is from
Historical Statistics, p. 10.
3Diﬀerences in Deﬂation Predictability Between the 1920s and 1930s
Some theories predict that only unanticipated deﬂation depresses real economic ac-
tivity. Lucas and Rapping (1969) argue that the 1930s deﬂation was unexpected and that
this was an important factor behind the severity of the Great Depression. Can diﬀerences
in the predictability of the 1920s and 1930s deﬂations explain the diﬀerence in the severity
of these two depressions? We address this question by comparing nominal and ex post real
interest rates between these two periods.3 If diﬀerences in the predictability of deﬂation can
e x p l a i nb o t ht h eG r e a tD e p r e s s i o na n dt h eD e p r e s s i o no f1921-22, we should observe very
low nominal interest rates in the 1920s, but relatively high nominal and ex-post real interest
rates during the 1930s.
Table 2: Nominal and Ex-Post Real Interest Rates: 1920s and 1930s4
Depression of 1921-22 The Great Depression
Years 1921 1922 Avg. 1930 1931 1932 1933 Avg.
Treasury Notes - Nominal 4.83 3.47 4.35 2.23 1.15 0.78 0.26 1.10
Treasure Notes - Real 19.63 8.87 14.25 4.73 10.38 10.95 2.78 7.21
Table 2 shows average annual nominal and real interest rates on 3 to 6 month U.S.
Treasury Notes and Certiﬁc a t e s . T h er e a lr a t ei st h en o m i n a lr a t em i n u st h ep e r c e n t a g e
change in the annual GNP deﬂator. The most striking feature of these data is that both
nominal and real interest rates are higher during the Depression of 1921-22. The average
nominal rate on Treasury securities is 4.35 percent between 1921-22 compared to an average
of 1.1 percent between 1930-33. The average real rate on these securities is 14.25 percent
between 1921-22, compared to an average of 7.21 percent between 1930-30.5 These data
s u g g e s tt h a tt h e1930s deﬂation was more predictable than the 1920s deﬂation, rather than
3There is some work addressing the predictability of the 1930s deﬂation (see Hamilton (1992) and Cecchetti
(1992)), but we are unaware of any studies of the predictability of the deﬂa t i o no ft h ee a r l y1920s, or any
comparison of the predictability of deﬂation between the two periods.
4The data are from the Federal Reserve Board (1943). The results are very similar using 4-6 month prime
commercial paper.
5It may seem surprising that the deﬂation of the early 1920s was more unexpected, since monetary policy
after wars traditionally produced deﬂation. However, the timing and rates of these deﬂations were probably
much less certain.
4less predictable. We conclude from these data that unexpected deﬂation is not the key factor
behind the relative severity of the Great Depression.6
Diﬀerences in Private Debt-Deﬂation Between the 1920s and 1930s
Irving Fisher (1933) suggested that deﬂation and high private debt levels contributed
to the Great Depression by reducing borrower wealth and constraining lending. This is
known as the “debt-deﬂation” view of the Great Depression. Before asking whether this
story is consistent with both depressions, it is important to note that there are two separate
macroeconomic eﬀects from this redistribution. We call one the debt burden eﬀect of debt-
deﬂation, which is Fisher’s original view. The other is the wealth transfer eﬀect, in which
unexpected deﬂation transfers wealth from debtors to creditors. On average, creditors are
older and borrowers are younger. This transfer increases the old generation’s consumption,
but changes their labor input little in absolute terms since their labor endowment is low.
The wealth transfer will tend to increase the hours of the young generation. Overall, the
wealth transfer eﬀect should increase aggregate hours and output and thus will tend to oﬀset
the debt burden eﬀect. Thus, there is no theoretical presumption that wealth redistributions
between debtors and creditors reduce aggregate employment and output.
If the “debt-deﬂation” story can explain the severity of the Great Depression, the debt
burden eﬀect must be quantitatively much more important in the 1930s than in the 1920s.
Two factors that aﬀect the quantitative impact of the debt burden eﬀect are the size of the
s t o c ko fd e b ta tt h es t a r to ft h ed e ﬂation and the pattern of deﬂation. A larger initial stock
of debt and a rapid deﬂation will tend to increase the debt burden eﬀect. We measure the
increase in the debt burden as the increase in the real value of debt (relative to output) due
to deﬂation over the ﬁrst two years of each depression.
Table 3 shows the initial stock of debt relative to output at the price level peak prior
to each depression, as well as the percentage change in prices in the ﬁrst two years of each
depression, the implied percentage increase in the debt burden relative to initial output, and
the percentage change in real output. The most striking feature of these data is that the
6Some economists have also suggested that high real interest rates were an important contributing factor
to the Great Depression. The fact that real interest rates were substantially higher during the 1921-22
Depression casts doubt on this explanation.
5debt burden channel rises more in 1921-22 than in 1929-31. The more rapid 1920s deﬂation
increased the debt burden by 0.29 between 1920-22, compared to 0.20 between 1929-31.T h i s
higher debt burden increase, however, is associated with a much smaller decrease in output.
Real GNP fells 3.8 percent between 1920-22, but fells 22.4 percent between 1929-31.
Table 3: Increase in the Private Debt Burden Due to Deﬂation:
The Depression of 1921-22 vs. the Great Depression7
Private Debt %4 in Price Level Increase in Debt Burden %4 in GNP
Relative to in First 2 Years in First 2 Years in First 2 Years
Year Output of Deﬂation of Deﬂation of Deﬂation
1920 1.20 -19.4% .29 -3.8%
1929 1.56 -11.5% .20 -22.4%
Explaining the severity of the Great Depression through debt-deﬂation thus requires a
model in which an initial debt stock of 1.2, with 19p e r c e n td e ﬂation, is associated with only
a 4 percent decrease in output, while an initial debt stock of 1.56, with 11 percent deﬂation,
drives down output by more than 22 percent.8 We are unaware of any quantitatively plausible
model that is consistent with these observations. We conclude from these data that the




where D is the debt-to-output ratio.
There are two basic sources of data on business liabilities in the Historical Statistics. The ﬁrst is the
nominal debt series put out by the BEA, which we have used. The second is from IRS data on corporate
tax returns (see series V 108-140). The IRS data only begins in 1926, and there appears to be a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence as to the indicated increase in corporate debt levels between the two sources. The IRS data indicate
that corporate debt in the form of bonded debt and mortgages rose 47% between 1926 and 1929. This ﬁgure
seems too large and suggests that the coverage level was initially low when the IRS was ﬁrst collecting the
returns data. This view is supported by the observation that according to the IRS data the total debt of the
corporate sector - including notes, accounts payable, bonded debt and mortgages - was only $55.8 billion in
1926, while the net debt from the BEA for the total corporate sector in 1926 was $76.2 billion.
8Olney (1999) argues that high consumer debt levels and extreme default penalties help account for the
large drop in consumption in 1930. If this indebtedness was key, we would expect a larger than normal
decrease in consumer durables spending in 1930. However, the decrease in the ratio of durables to output in
1930 is small relative to postwar recessions. The major decrease in consumption in 1930 is due to nondurables
and services.
6debt-deﬂation story does not explain why the Great Depression was worse than the 1921-22
Depression.9
Diﬀerences in Wages Between the 1920s and 1930s
Some economists believe that wage changes increased the depressing eﬀects of deﬂa-
tion in the 1930s. Before addressing whether diﬀerences in wages can explain the diﬀerence
between the Great Depression and the Depression of 1921-22, it is important to recognize
that there is disagreement over how wage changes may have contributed to the Great Depres-
sion. Some economists, for example Lucas and Rapping (1972), and Lucas (1983), argue that
the Great Depression was severe because nominal wages fell so much.O t h e r s , f o r e x a m p l e
Bernanke and Carey (1996), Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), and Eichengreen and Sachs
(1985), argue that the Great Depression was severe because nominal wages were imperfectly
ﬂexible and did not fall enough.
Since the Lucas-Rapping view is based on unexpected deﬂation, and it is unlikely that
unexpected deﬂation is responsible for the severity of the Great Depression, we focus on the
inﬂexible wage hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, inﬂexible nominal wages, combined
with deﬂation, raised real wages which reduced employment and output.
Explaining the relative severity of the Great Depression through high wages requires:
(1) real wages well above trend in the 1930s, and signiﬁcantly higher than wages in1921-22,
and (2) a theory of labor market failure during the 1930s - if the Great Depression was caused
by high real wages, there would have been enormous competitive pressure for wages to fall.
We begin by examining wages between the two Depressions. Unfortunately, there is
limited survey wage data that is both of reasonable quality and is consistently available during
both the 1920s and 1930s. Two sectors for which such data are available are agriculture and
manufacturing. Tables 4 and 5 show that detrended wage changes are fairly similar between
the two episodes and that wage changes diﬀered signiﬁcantly across sectors of the economy.
Some real wages fell substantially during both depressions, while others remained near trend.
The wage in the farm sector is an example of one real wage that fell signiﬁcantly during both
9It is worth noting that the diﬀerence in debt levels between the two periods - 1.2 vs. 1.56 - may overstate
the actual diﬀerence in the debt burden channel, since ﬁnancial markets were probably more sophisticated in
the 1930s, and as a consequence might have managed larger debt levels more eﬃciently.
7depressions. Table 4 shows that, on average, it is about 28 percent below trend during both
periods.
Table 4: Farm Wages10
Depression of 1921-22 The Great Depression
(1920 = 100) (1929 = 100)
Years 1921 1922 1930 1931 1932 1933
Real Wage 71.9 73.1 93.0 76.8 64.7 60.2
Table 5: Manufacturing Average Hourly Earnings11
Depression of 1921-22 The Great Depression
(1920 = 100) (1929 = 100)
Years 1921 1922 1930 1931 1932 1933
Real Wage 101.5 101.2 102.1 106.8 106.5 104.2
In contrast, the real manufacturing wage rose modestly during the Great Depression
and remained near trend in 1921-22. Table 5 shows the manufacturing wage during these
two depressions. The basic data for the Great Depression are from surveys conducted by
the National Industrial Conference Board, and are considered to be among the best wage
measures during the Great Depression.12 The real manufacturing wage, on average, was
roughly 5 percent above trend during 1930-33 and about 1 percent above trend during the
Depression of 1921-22.
10Source: Historical Statistics, p. 468. The farm wage rate is the daily wage without room and board. It
is deﬂated by the GNP deﬂator and is detrended at 1.4 percent per year, as this is the average growth rate
of real hourly compensation between 1947 and 1997.
11These data are deﬂated by the GNP deﬂator. We detrended manufacturing wages at a 1.4 percent annual
rate, as this is the average growth rate of real hourly compensation between 1947 and 1997. The average
growth rate of real manufacturing wages between 1923 and 1929 was slightly higher at 1.6 percent per year.
12The 1930s data are from Hanes (1996). The 1920s data is from the National Industrial Conference Board,
and include average hourly earnings of all wage earners in 25 industries plus anthracite mining, railroads, and
building trades. Industries include metal, textiles, leather, paper, furniture, lumber, meat, rubber. The data
a r eo np a g e2 5 ,t a b l e2 .
8These manufacturing wage diﬀerences between the 1920s and 1930s do not seem large
enough to account for the relative severity of the Great Depression. But without a formal
model we do not know how much of the Great Depression these diﬀerences can explain.
We therefore construct a two-sector general equilibrium model in Section 3 to assess the
quantitative contribution of high wages in some sectors to the Great Depression.
Diﬀerences in Bank Closings Between the 1920s and 1930s
Many banks either temporarily suspended operations or failed during the early 1930s.
Bernanke’s (1983) widely-cited work shows that the number of banks that either closed tem-
porarily or failed is a signiﬁcant predictor of output during the Great Depression. Bernanke’s
work has led a number of economists to conclude that bank closings were an important con-
tributing factor to the Great Depression. For example, Christina Romer’s (1993) survey of
the Great Depression argues that these closing were responsible for much of the fall in output
between 1930 and 1933. According to the bank closing hypothesis, bank suspensions and
failures destroyed private information about borrowers, which in turn reduced the eﬃciency
of ﬁnancial intermediation (see Romer 1993).
Table 6: Behavior of Commercial Bank Deposits13
1921-22 Depression The Great Depression
Years 1921 1922 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Suspended/Total 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 1.7% 4.3% 2.0% 11.0%
Loss/Total 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.8% 0.4% 1.3%
Total/Output 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.78 0.75
Can bank closings explain the diﬀerence between the Great Depression and the 1921-
22 Depression? Table 6 presents a comparison of bank closings in the 1920s and 1930s. Since
the importance of a bank suspension or failure depends on the size of the bank, we measure
bank closings not by the number of banks that closed, but rather by the fraction of deposits
in banks that either suspended operations or failed. The table thus shows the fraction of
13Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941, Board of Governors.
9total deposits in commercial banks that either suspended operations or failed, and shows the
fraction of total deposits lost by depositors.14
Bank suspensions and failures were higher during the Great Depression. About 0.5
percent of banks, measured by deposits, either suspended operations or failed during the
Depression of 1921-22, and about 0.2 percent of total deposits was ultimately lost. In com-
parison, an average of 2.6 percent of banks either suspended operations or failed between
1930-32, and an average of 0.4 percent of total deposits were ultimately lost during that
period. Both of these ratios rose signiﬁcantly in 1933 when President Franklin Roosevelt
declared a bank holiday. An explicit economic model is needed to determine the quantitative
importance of these diﬀerences for the severity of the Great Depression. We develop a model
for this purpose in Section 4.
The ﬁnal data we present is the ratio of total commercial bank deposits to output
during these two depressions. This ratio rises signiﬁcantly during the Great Depression. We
present this data because it will be a key ratio in the model that we develop for assessing the
macroeconomic impact of bank closings.
B. Summary
This section assessed whether four popular deﬂation stories for the Great Depression
can explain why the 20 percent deﬂa t i o no ft h e1930s produced the Great Depression, and
why the 20 percent deﬂation of the 1920s produced a much milder downturn. For any of
these stories to be consistent with both depressions requires that the story be quantitatively
important during the 1930s, but quantitatively unimportant during the 1920s. We found
that two of these four stories - unexpected deﬂation and debt-deﬂation - do not satisfy this
criterion, and therefore do not seem capable of explaining the relative severity of the Great
Depression. For the other two stories - imperfectly ﬂexible wages and bank failures - we did
ﬁnd some diﬀerences between the 1920s and 1930s. We now develop two models - one for
assessing the role of inﬂexible nominal wages and one for assessing the role of banking shocks
14Since deposits at failed and suspended banks are only available for commercial banks, we show this ratio
relative to commercial deposits. Commercial deposits accounted for over 85% of total deposits during 1919-23
and over 80% during 1929-34. We include failures and suspensions together since we are unaware of any data
that separates these two categories.
10- to quantitatively evaluate how much these two factors contributed to the Great Depression.
3. How Much of the Great Depression Was Due to High Wages?
A. A Two-Sector General Equilibrium Model
This section presents a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the macroe-
conomic eﬀects of high wages. Since wages in some sectors, such as agriculture, were ﬂexible,
we develop a two-sector model in which the wage in one sector is ﬁxed above the market
clearing level, and the wage in the other sector is ﬂexible. We assume that the ﬁxed wage
in the distorted sector is equal to the manufacturing wage; this assumption is discussed in
detail below. All labor hired in that sector must be paid the above-market wage. This ap-
proach captures the basic distorting eﬀects of above-market wages but allows us to abstract
from other monetary features that would complicate the environment. All other prices in the
economy, including the wage in the nondistorted sector, adjust to equate supply and demand
in the other markets.
We ﬁrst summarize the physical environment. We then analyze the pure market-
clearing version of the model with no wage distortions, and then analyze the model with
above-market wages in the manufacturing sector.
Environment
Time is denoted by t =0 ,1,2,...,∞. There is a representative family with many mem-
bers. Family members supply labor, consume a single physical good, and accumulate physical
capital. There are two distinct types of physical goods: Final goods are the numeraire, and
c a nb ee i t h e rc o n s u m e do ri n v e s t e dt oa u g m e n tt h ec a p i t a ls t o c k . T h e s eﬁnal goods are
produced using two types of intermediate goods. Each intermediate good is produced from
a distinct sector. We denote the sector that will be distorted by the above-market wage as
sector m, and the nondistorted sector as sector n. We denote the output of the ﬁnal good
by Y, and the output of the two intermediate goods by Yi, w h e r ew er e f e rt ot h et w ot y p e s
of intermediate goods with subscripts m and n. These two intermediate goods are produced
using identical Cobb-Douglas technologies with capital, denoted by Ki, and labor, denoted
by Hi,f o ri = m,n. The parameter A is labor-augmenting technological change.
Capital and labor are both sector speciﬁc - neither labor nor capital can move from
11one sector to the other. Thus, workers who are unable to work as much as they wish in
the distorted sector are not permitted to move to the nondistorted sector. This assumption
ampliﬁes the distorting eﬀects of the high wage.
Technologies




















The parameter A denotes labor augmenting technical progress.
The Market-Clearing Model
The Household’s Problem. There is a representative household with many members. At
date 0, it is assumed that half of the family members work in the m sector, and half work in
the n sector. 15 The household’s preferences over sequences of consumption of the ﬁnal good





t [log(ct)+B{log(1 − hmt)+ψlog(1 − hnt)}]. (2)
The household owns the capital stock and chooses consumption, ct, work eﬀort in the two
sectors, hmt and hnt, and investment, xmt and xnt, to maximize (2) subject to the following
present value budget constraint, capital accumulation constraint, and time constraint:
∞ X
t=0
Qt[wmthmt + wnthnt − ct + rmtkmt + rntknt − xmt − xnt] ≥ 0, (3)
15This preference speciﬁcation with diﬀerent utility weights on leisure permits us to retain the tractability
of a representative agent formulation. The diﬀerent utility weights are required when employment is diﬀerent
between the two sectors (e.g. α 6=0 .5). It can be shown that this speciﬁcation is equivalent to an environment
with agents who work in either sector m or sector n, and who are perfectly insured against idiosyncratic shocks
to their speciﬁc sectors.
12kit+1 = xit +( 1− δ)kit,i∈ {m,n}. (4)
The wage rates in the m and n sectors are denoted wm and wn, respectively, and the rental
prices of capital in the two sectors are analogously denoted rm and rn. Note that the param-
eter ψ c a p t u r e st h er e l a t i v es i z ed i ﬀerence in employment for the household. The date t price
of the physical good in terms of date 0 goods is denoted by Qt.
T h eI n t e r m e d i a t eG o o d sF i r m s ’P r o b l e m . We assume that there is a single producer
of the m intermediate good, and a single producer of the n intermediate good, both of whom
behave competitively.16 The intermediate goods producer in sector i, i ∈ {m,n}, maximizes







i − wihi − riki. (5)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for hiring the inputs imply that factor prices are equated to
the value of marginal products:
















Equilibrium Conditions. A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of se-
quences of allocations and a price system such that the allocations solve the household’s
problem subject to it’s budget constraint, and given prices, that the allocations solve the
ﬁrm’s problem, given prices, that the labor market, the capital services market, the inter-
mediate goods market all clear, that the resource constraint is satisﬁed, and that prices are
equal to marginal productivities.
16We assume a single ﬁrm that behaves competitively, rather than a large number of competitive ﬁrms, to
economize on notation.
13The Model with Some Wages above the Market Clearing Level
We now modify our model so that the wage in sector m is set above its market clearing
level. Rather than develop a monetary model with ﬁxed nominal wages and deﬂation, we
adopt a much simpler speciﬁcation that captures the distorting eﬀects of above-market wages.
At the start of period t the wage is ﬁxed exogenously for that period at a level above its normal
market-clearing level. We denote this ﬁxed wage by ¯ wmt. All labor hired in this sector at date
t must be paid this wage. The above-market wage is a completely unexpected shock each
period.17
The ﬁxed wage changes our model in one key way: labor input in this sector is no
longer a choice variable for the household.18 The households are rationed in terms of their







Labor input in the distorted sector is determined by ﬁrms’ labor demand. The representative
ﬁrm hires labor until the ﬁxed wage is equated to labor’s value of marginal product:
(1 − θ)pmt(Kmt/Hmt)
θ =¯ wmt. (7)
The high wage has direct and indirect eﬀects on aggregate output. We deﬁne the direct
eﬀect as the change in aggregate output from the increase in the distorted wage, holding all
other prices ﬁxed. This eﬀect is measured by solving for ym from (7), given ¯ wmt and holding
pmt ﬁxed, and then solving for aggregate output, holding yn ﬁxed. The indirect, or general
equilibrium, eﬀects of the high wage operate through changes in prices and the other wage.
These indirect eﬀects depend not only on ¯ wmt, but also on all the model parameters. Assessing
the quantitative eﬀects of the high manufacturing wage on the economy thus requires choosing
parameter values and numerically computing the equilibrium path of the model economy.
17There are many ways to model household beliefs about future distortions to manufacturing wages. Our
approach, in which households believe that the ﬁxed manufacturing wage does not recur, treats each wage
shock as a completely unexpected event. As we show later, this approach simpliﬁes computing the equilibrium
considerably. This approach is also consistent with the prevailing view that the Great Depression was the
result of unexpected shocks.
18Since no other markets are distorted, all other equations in the model will continue to be satisﬁed.
14B. Choosing Parameter Values and Computing an Equilibrium
Technology and Preference Parameter Values
Several of the parameters in our model are commonly used in the equilibrium business
cycle literature. We choose values for these parameters that are similar to values in other
studies. Since the data are available at an annual frequency, we deﬁne the unit of time in the
model to be one year.
The common parameters in our model are β,A,B,δ, and θ. We set β =0 .96, which
is comparable to values used in other studies. We assume that the level of technological
progress, A is given by At =( 1+g)t,and choose g =0 .02. Our values for β and g imply a
steady-state interest rate of about 6 percent. We choose B such that the household works
about 1/3 of their discretionary time in the steady state. The additional leisure parameter ψ
is chosen so that in the undistorted version of the model, the household chooses to allocate
the appropriate fraction of labor to each sector at a common wage. We set θ =0 .33, and the
depreciation rate to 7 percent.
The ﬁnal parameter we discuss in this section is φ, which governs the substitution
elasticity between the two sectors in ﬁnal goods production. Since manufacturing appears to
be a key sector distorted by the high wage during the Depression, we use postwar data on
changes in manufacturing’s expenditure share and relative price to choose a value for φ. Man-
ufacturing’s expenditure share and relative price have both fallen over the postwar period,
which is consistent with a substitution elasticity between manufacturing and nonmanufactur-
ing of less than one. We choose a benchmark value of φ = −1, which implies a substitution
elasticity of 0.5. We also conduct our analysis with a low substitution elasticity of 0.1 to
assess the robustness of our results.
The Distorted Wage and the Relative Size of the Distorted Sector
Finally, we need to choose a measure of how much real wages rose in the distorted
sector, and we need to choose a value for the fraction of the economy distorted by the high
wage.
We use Hanes’ (1996) compilation of the Conference Board’s manufacturing wage
data as the measure of the wage for the distorted sector. This wage is shown in Table 5
for each year of the Great Depression. The Conference Board wage data have also been
15used in some other analyses of the Great Depression, including O’Brien (1989), Lebergott
(1990), Bernanke (1986), and Bernanke and Carey (1996). This wage is the most natural
choice for a distorted wage in this study, because the data is of relatively high quality, and
because there is a plausible economic explanation for why manufacturing wages were above
market clearing despite the downturn in economic activity: government intervention. This
intervention comes from President Herbert Hoover’s belief that maintaining nominal wages
would prevent am a j o rd e p r e s s i o nb yk e e p i n gd e m a n dh i g h . I naW h i t eH o u s em e e t i n g ,
Hoover asked the C.E.O.’s of major manufacturing corporations to not cut their wages. They
agreed to maintain wages, and seemed to honor that agreement during the ﬁrst two years
of the Great Depression - manufacturing wages fell only 4.4 percent between December 1929
and September 1931. (See Lamont (1930) for a description of the meeting).19
It is worth noting that there are also manufacturing wage surveys produced by the the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) that could be used to measure the distorted wage, but these
surveys do not cover all manufacturing industries, and they suﬀer from sampling problems.
In particular, large ﬁr m s ,w h i c ht e n dt op a yh i g h e rw a g e st h a ns m a l lﬁrms, were oversampled.
We now turn to choosing the fraction of the economy distorted by the high wage. In
our model, this fraction is governed by the paramter α. Unfortunately, we do not know of any
established measures of the fraction of the economy distorted by the high wage. The data we
presented earlier suggests that on average, manufacturers paid high wages, but farmers did
not. But since we do not have wage measures across the entire economy of the same quality
as the Conference Board’s wage data, it is diﬃcult to estimate how much of the economy was
subject to high wages.20
To address this uncertainty over the fraction of the economy distorted by the high
19The aﬀect of this intervention, however, weakened during the last two years of the Depression. By late
1931, Gerard Swope, C.E.O. of General Electric, circulated an industrial plan that would cartelize much of the
U.S. economy. Hoover denounced this plan and refused to recommend it to Congress. Nominal manufacturing
wages began to fall signiﬁcantly after Hoover’s condemnation of the Swope plan.
20There are wage measures in some non-manufacturing sectors, and there are also BLS payroll and em-
ployment data outside of manufacturing that can be used to construct average employee compensation. A
diﬃculty with these BLS payroll data is that the coverage is narrow in some sectors, the data does not in-
clude hours, and in some sectors the data combines all classes of workers, including executives. This last fact
suggests that constructing measures of compensation per employee from these data is subject to signiﬁcant
compositional bias. We discuss compositional bias, and how it may have aﬀected diﬀerent wage measures
during the Depression, at the end of this section.
16wage, we conduct our analysis for two values of the parameter α. We ﬁrst assume that the
entire manufacturing sector was subject to the distorted wage. Given Hoover’s view about the
importance of maintaining high wages, we also assume the federal government paid the high
wage. These two sectors account for about 28 percent of employment in 1929. We therefore
choose a benchmark value for α such that this sector accounts for 28 percent of employment
in the deterministic, ﬂexible price steady state of the model. We also conduct the analysis for
α =0 .50, which implies that the distorted sector was 50 percent of the economy. This choice
seems to be a plausible upper bound on the fraction of the economy distorted by the high
wage. This is because at least 30 percent of workers were not paid the high wage (farming
and sole proprietors), and because there does not seem to be direct measures of wages of
suﬃcient quality that indicate that half of all workers were paid wages above trend values.
Computing the Equilibrium
Computation of the equilibrium of the model with high manufacturing wages is facil-
itated by our assumption that each wage shock is a completely unexpected, one-time event
- the household expects at each date that the economy returns to pure market clearing the
following period. This permits us to compute the equilibrium for each year of the Depression
(1930-33) recursively.
Since households expect the economy to return to market clearing in the following
period, the value of capital next period is a function of the single state variable in the economy,
the aggregate capital stock. To compute the equilibrium at date t when the manufacturing
wage is higher than its competitive level, we use a log-linear approximation of the right-hand
side of the Euler equation from the pure market-clearing model around its steady state. This
approximation allows us to estimate the marginal value of an additional unit of capital and
is used with the static ﬁrst-order conditions of the model to compute the equilibrium for
each year of the Depression. This involves solving N nonlinear equations in N unknowns for
each year. We feed our measures of the manufacturing wage for 1930-33 into the model and
compute the equilibrium path of the economy for these years. Our ﬁndings are presented in
the next section.
17C. Macroeconomic Eﬀects of High Wages: 1930-33
Tables 7-9 show the predicted path of the U.S. economy between 1930-1933 for our
model with benchmark parameter values and alternative parameter values. We ﬁnd that the
predicted depression for all these parameter values is much less severe than the actual U.S.
Great Depression.
Table 7: Predicted Great Depression (1929 = 100)
Benchmark Model
Years Y C I hm hn
1930 99.2 99.8 96.9 97.8 99.3
1931 97.3 99.3 90.4 93.1 97.8
1932 97.2 98.9 91.1 93.3 98.0
1933 97.8 98.7 94.6 95.4 98.8
Table 7 shows the equilibrium path of output, consumption, and investment from
our benchmark model with about 28 percent of the economy distorted by the high wage.
Predicted real output is about 1 percent below trend in 19 3 0a n da b o u t2t o3p e r c e n t
below trend between 1931 and 1933. Most of the decrease in economic activity occurs in the
distorted sector. The high wage reduces employment in the distorted sector about 7 percent
below trend. In contrast, employment in the nondistorted sector falls only about 2 to 3
percent below trend. These predicted decreases in economic activity are much smaller than
the observed decreases in output, consumption, investment, and employment that occurred
between 1929-33.
There are two reasons why predicted economic activity falls so little compared to the
actual decrease in economic activity. First, the distorted sector is relatively small, which
means that the direct eﬀect of the high wage on aggregate output is small. Second, the
indirect, general equilibrium eﬀects tend to reduce, rather than amplify, the direct eﬀects.
The most important indirect eﬀect is the increase in the relative price of the manu-
factured good, which rises 3 to 4 percent above its steady-state level after 1930. The relative
price rises because the manufactured good is in relatively scarce supply and is not highly
18substitutable with the nonmanufactured good. This increase oﬀsets some of the distorting
eﬀects of the high manufacturing wage. Equation (7) shows that each percentage point in-
crease in the relative price of the manufactured good eﬀectively reduces the ﬁxed wage by
one percentage point. Thus, the 4.4 percent increase in the relative price of manufactured
goods in 1931 eﬀectively reduces the manufacturing wage from 6.8 percent above trend to
just 2.4 percent above trend.
Table 8 shows a decomposition of the change in output due to the direct and indirect
eﬀects. This decomposition shows that the negative direct eﬀects are partially oﬀset by the
indirect eﬀects.
Table 8: Decomposition of Predicted Output:
Direct and Indirect Eﬀects
Benchmark Model
Years %∆Y Direct Indirect
1930 -0.8% -1.5% 0.7%
1931 -2.7% -6.4% 3.7%
1932 -2.8% -6.3% 3.5%
1933 -2.2% -4.2% 2.0%
The eﬀects of the high wage depend on all the model parameters, but in particular
depend on the share parameter α. We therefore assess the robustness of the results by in-
creasing the distorted share of the economy to 50 percent, which in our view is a reasonable
upper bound on the distorted share of the economy.
Table 9 shows the equilibrium path of the model economy with α =0 .5. This higher
value in the model produces a larger decrease in economic activity, but this decrease is still
much smaller than the actual Great Depression. Real output is predicted to be 4.8 percent
below trend in 1932 with α =0 .5, compared to 2.8 percent below trend in the benchmark
v e r s i o no ft h em o d e l .W et h u sﬁnd that raising the share of the economy that must pay the
high wage to 50 percent does not materially change the ﬁndings.
19Table 9: Predicted Great Depression
Large Distorted Sector
(1929 = 100)
Years Y C I hm hn
1930 98.7 99.7 95.0 97.2 98.9
1931 95.6 98.9 84.2 91.2 96.4
1932 95.2 98.2 84.9 91.1 96.5
1933 96.1 97.8 90.1 93.6 97.8
We also conducted the analysis by reducing the elasticity of substitution between the
two sectors from 0.5 to 0.1. We do not present these results because this change did not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. Output falls about one percentage point more than in the
benchmark model and the relative price of the good from the distorted sector rises more.
These results suggest that the high wage was not the primary cause of the Great
Depression. Given our measure of the wage from the manufacturing sector, our benchmark
model shows that this wage accounts for about a 3 percent decline in output at the trough
of the Great Depression, compared to an actual 38 percent decline. Increasing the size of
the distorted sector to 50 percent, or reducing the substitution elasticity to 0.1 did not
signiﬁcantly change the results.
This simple model focused on the basic distorting eﬀects of an above-market wage
through two channels - the direct reduction in sectoral labor input,and the general equilibrium
eﬀects of the high wage through prices to the other sectors of the economy. One reason why
the model doesn’t generate a large depression is because the general equilibrium eﬀects oﬀset
some of the distortion of the high wage. In particular, the sectoral high wage reduces output
primarily in the distorted sector, and this drives up that sector’s relative price and reduces
the macroeconomic impact of the distortion.
This result raises the possibility that the wage story might have a better chance if the
theory could be modiﬁed to eliminate the relative price increase. This approach is not likely to
be succesful, however. Eliminating the relative price increase arising from the wage distortion
requires substantially reducing the demand for the output of that sector. This reduction in
20demand requires a second shock. In our model, this second shock is a decline in the parameter
α, which governs the distorted sector’s share of aggregate output. Reducing α would reduce
the demand for goods from the distorted sector and would prevent the relative price of the
distorted good from rising. But this higher real wage won’t generate a major depression
because the reduction in α also reduces the quantitative importance of the distorted sector
and thus reduces the macroeconomic impact of that sector.21
Finally, our model indicates another diﬃculty with the wage hypothesis: the timing
of the depression and the timing of wage increases. With the exception of 1931, real wage
increases do not occur at the same time as output declines. Real output fell 13 percent in
1930, yet the real manufacturing wage remained close to trend. Similarly, real output fell
more than 17 percent between 1931 and 1932, yet the real manufacturing wage was roughly
unchanged between 1931 and 1932. This lack of coincidence between the timing of output
changes and wage increases suggests that some other shock reduced output in these years.
Accounting for the Depression through imperfectly ﬂexible manufacturing wages is
diﬃcult - the real wage increase is too small and aﬀects too little of the economy, and wage
increases coincide with lower output only in 1931. The hypothesis would have a better chance
if wages were signiﬁcantly higher and aﬀe c t e dm o r eo ft h ee c o n o m y ,a n di ft h e r ew a sm o r e
coincidence between the timing of wage increases and the Great Depression. But as the next
section describes, these factors are unlikely.
D. Measured Wages Are Probably Biased Upwards
We are skeptical that actual wages were as high as the manufacturing wage measures
suggest. This is because the composition of employees changed during the Depression, and
this compositional shift likely induces upward bias in the wage measures. Researchers who
analyze the cyclical pattern of real wages argue that cyclical changes in the composition of
employment leads to wage measures that are biased upwards during recessions and biased
downwards during expansions. This is because hours of low wage earners tend to be much
more sensitive to the business cycle than hours of high wage earners. Consequently, the
21This discussion hightlights the problems associated with focusing on the product wage instead of the
real wage. In particular, high product wages result from a combination a postive shock to real wages and a
negative shock to product demand.
21average employed worker during a recession tends to be a higher wage earner than the average
employed worker during an expansion.
Lebergott (1990) and Margo (1993) argue that compositional eﬀects may have been
particularly important during the Great Depression. Lebergott argues that compositional
shifts in employee quality and in the quality of operating establishments may result in mea-
sured wages substantially overstating actual wages. He indicates that layoﬀs were concen-
trated among low-wage, young workers, which tends to increase the average measured wage of
those individuals remaining employed. He also notes that relatively young ﬁrms, rather than
older established ﬁrms, failed during the Depression, and that these younger ﬁrms tended to
pay signiﬁcantly lower wages. This compositional change also raises the average measured
wage of those individuals remaining employed. Margo makes a very similar point regarding
compositional bias.22
How large are these biases? Lebergott cites some microeconomic evidence which, he
argues, points to signiﬁcant upward bias arising from changes in employee quality. He notes
that Westinghouse and General Electric retained their most productive employees during
the Depression, and also cut these employees’ wages by 10 percent between 1929 and 1931.
However, the Conference Board’s wage survey for this industry, which was heavily inﬂuenced
by these two ﬁrms, shows that wages were unchanged during this period. This deviation
between the wages paid by these two ﬁrms and the survey wage is likely due to changes
in the composition of employees at the two ﬁrms.23 While this microeconomic example
suggests the possibility of important compositional biases, we do not have the necessary
individual wage and employment data to measure aggregate compositional eﬀects. To obtain
22There is also evidence that some ﬁrms reclassiﬁed workers down (e.g., a foreman works as an assembly
line worker). (See Bernanke and Carey (1996) and Lebergott (1991)). This would tend to bias wages in
the opposite direction if the individual’s wage was unchanged, but the value of the individual’s marginal
product fell. It is unclear, however, whether reclassiﬁed workers’ wages were changed as a consequence of the
reclassiﬁcation.
23Lebergott notes that these two ﬁrms laid oﬀ low productivity workers, re-assigned some higher skilled
workers, and assigned the retained workers to either 2,3, or 4 day workweeks, depending on worker ability, with
the most productive workers receiving 4 day workweeks. Lebergott clearly interprets these personnel decisons
and their impact on the measured wage as an example of upward compositional wage bias. As we noted above,
this interpretation is clearly warranted provided that those re-classiﬁed employees who performed diﬀerent
tasks were paid their value marginal product. If these employees were paid in excess of their value marginal
product, however, this eﬀect would tend to oﬀset the the upward wage bias resulting from the change in the
composition of employees and the allocation of work towards the most productive employees.
22a rough idea of how compositional shifts may have aﬀected measured wages more broadly,
we compute estimates of compositional bias from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) . We estimate the bias using two separate
computations. The ﬁrst computation is motivated by Lebergott’s argument that employment
loss was concentrated among the lowest wage earners. Determining how this compositional
shift aﬀects the wage requires specifying how employment loss was distributed during the
Depression. To capture Lebergott’s argument, we assume that the bottom 20 percent of
wage earners lost employment and that the remaining employment loss was evenly distributed
across all other workers. Using CPS data from 1998 for all full-time workers, we ﬁnd that the
average wage for the top 80 percent of wage earners is about 15 percent higher than for all
full-time wage earners. This implies that the average wage during the Great Depression may
have been overstated by 15 percent if the distribution of employment loss was concentrated
among low wage earners in this fashion, and if the wage distribution in the 1930s was similar
to the wage distribution today.24
Our second computation uses measures of cyclical compositional wage bias from post-
war data to estimate the compositional bias in the Depression. Solon, Barsky, and Parker
(1994) estimate the diﬀerence between the response to ﬂuctuations in output relative to trend
between aggregate wages and individual wages from the PSID. This diﬀerence is a direct mea-
sure of the compositional bias from using aggregate wages as a measure of an average wage,
and the bias is an increasing function of the magnitude of the decrease in output. Applying
their estimates to the Depression suggests that compositional shifts biased measured wages
up by about 18 percent.25
While we cannot draw a ﬁrm conclusion about the quantitative magnitude of composi-
tional wage bias during the Depression, these estimates suggest that measured wages may be
substantially upward biased.26 This suggests that manufacturing wages may have been signif-
24We thank Daniel Hamermesh for performing this computation. The data is from the CPS-ORG 1998.
Full-time workers are deﬁned as those working 35 or more hours per week.
25Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) only reported the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient between the ﬂuctuations
in the coeﬃcient on the unemployment rate relative to trend. We thank Jonathon Parker for computing their
estimates using real chain-weighted GDP rather than unemployment.
The measure of the compositional bias is: (.558-.0896)*(log(dGDP(1933)/dGDP(1929)), where dGDP is
the deviation of real GDP per adult from trend.
26It is interesting to note that the cross-sectional diﬀerences in employment and wages between manufac-
23icantly below trend at the trough of the Great Depression after correcting for compositional
bias. 27
4. How Much of the Great Depression Was Due to Banking Shocks?
This section asks how much banking shocks contributed to the Great Depression.
Unfortunately, there is no standard version of the neoclassical growth model with ﬁnancial
intermediation to use for this purpose, nor is there a standard deﬁnition of the banking shock
- at least not as an explicit shock to primitives, technologies or endowments, that can be
used in a general equilibrium model. We therefore develop a simple, benchmark neoclassical
model in which banking output, which is produced with deposits and information capital, is
an input into production of the economy’s ﬁnal good. We deﬁne the banking shock to be
the stock of information capital lost as a consequence of bank closings. This deﬁnition is
consistent with the literature which associates the banking shock with bank failures and the
destruction of information capital. We use the model to address three questions: How much
did bank closings reduce intermediation capital? How much did this loss of intermediation
capital reduce output? Are the predicted eﬀects of bank closings on other variables consistent
with the data?
turing and farming are consistent with signiﬁcant compositional bias. Since the bias should be most severe for
sectors in which employment fell substantially, we should observe relatively high wages associated with low
employment. Manufacturing hours fell more than 40 percent, and measured wages were about ﬁve percent
above trend. In contrast, farm hours remained near trend, and measured wages fell substantially.
27Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (BEE, 2000) construct a measure of hourly employee compensation that rises
about four percentage points more than the Conference Board’s measure of hourly manufacturing wages, and
use changes in this measure as a proxy for changes in the average wage during the Great Depression. There are
two reasons why the change in their average compensation measure may deviate considerably from the change
in the average person’s wage during the Depression. First, as we noted before, it is diﬃcult to infer individual
wage changes from an aggregated compensation measure because of compositional shifts in employment.
Thus, their compensation measure is also subject to upward bias under the assumption that layoﬀsw e r e
concentrated among low wage earners. Second, there is an inconsistency in their construction of total hours
worked which is used in measuring average hourly compensation. In particular, their measure of total hours
worked is equal to the product of full-time equivalent employees (from the NIPA) multiplied by Kendrick’s
(1961) average hours worked for full-time equivalent workers, which includes not only employees, but also
proprietors and unpaid family workers. These latter two groups are quantitatively important, accounting for
about 38 percent of Kendrick’s full-time equivalent workers in 1929 (see p. 304). For BEE’s caclulation, this
measure of hours would be correct only if ﬂuctuations in proprietor and unpaid family hours were identical
to ﬂuctuations in employee hours.
24A. A Model with Financial Intermediation
Our model extends the standard neoclassical growth model by requiring that some
investment be intermediated.T h i s m o d i ﬁes the standard model to include both internally
and externally ﬁnanced investment. In our model, a fraction of the capital stock is transferred
from households to ﬁrms by an intermediation technology that uses real resources. This
intermediation technology gives rise to borrowing and lending rates. The model allows us to
analyze the eﬀects of shocks to the intermediation technology on output, intermediated and
internally ﬁnanced investment, and borrowing and lending rates.
We now describe the model in detail. There are two plants that produce a single
physical good using capital. At the beginning of the period there are three types of capital:
installed physical capital at each plant, which we denote by K1 and K2, respectively; unin-
stalled physical capital, which is held by households and is denoted by D; and intermediation
capital, which we denote by Z. Intermediation capital is in ﬁxed supply.
The capital stocks at each plant can be increased during the period with uninstalled
capital. We denote by x1 and x2 the amounts that are installed during the period. This
uninstalled capital must be intermediated, and some of this capital is used up during the
intermediation process. The capital available for production is thus Kj+ xj. At the end of
each period, some output is used to costlessly augment the capital stock at each plant, and
the remainder is distributed to households who either consume it or hold it as uninstalled
capital for the following period.
The plant technologies are subject to an i.i.d. shock, which is realized at the beginning
of each period. The production shock can take on two levels: εh and εl, where εh > εl > 0.
One plant receives the high shock εh, and one plant receives the low shock εl. Each plant has
an equal probability of receiving the high productivity level, and we normalize the shocks so
that 0.5(εh + εl)=1 .
After the idiosyncratic plant productivity shock has been realized, uninstalled capital




We will assume that G exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and that G(D,Z) ≤ D. The
25resources used in the intermediation process are the quantity D − G(D,Z).
Plant output is produced from a CRS Cobb-Douglas technology that uses capital and
labor. For simplicity, we assume that there is one unit of labor at each plant, and that labor
is in ﬁxed supply. Plant output is given by
yj = Aεj(Kj + xj)
γ.
Plant output is used for either consumption or investment. Investment from retained
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where D0 denotes the next period’s level of uninstalled capital and K
0
j the amount of capital
installed at plant i at the beginning of the next period. We require that output net of retained
investment be nonnegative.



















jt ≥ 0 for each j =1 ,2 and t (11)
xjt ≥ 0 for each j =1 ,2 and t. (12)
We assume that the diﬀerence in the εh and εl is small enough that the nonnegativity
constraint on retained earnings given in equation (11) never binds. Since the productivity
shocks are i.i.d., it is optimal to set K1 = K2 = K/2. Thus, we aggregate plant capital and
deﬁne the state variables to be (K,D).
The solution to this planning problem can be decentralized as a competitive equi-
librium. This allows us to solve for equilibrium borrowing and lending rates. We assume
26competitive proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms operate each plant. We also assume that there is a com-
petitive proﬁt maximizing intermediary who operates the intermediation technology. This
intermediary receives funds from the household at the savings rate 1+rs and loans it out at
the borrowing rate 1+rb.
In equilibrium, the marginal cost of additional capital to the high productivity plant,
1+rb, must be equal to its marginal productivity:
1+rb = γAεh(K/2+G(Dt,Z))
γ−1.
Similarly, the interest rate on savings must be just equal to the return on uninstalled capital:
1+rs = γAεh(K/2+G(Dt,Z))
γ−1GD(Dt,Z).
The spread between these two rates is
rb − rs = γAεh(K/2+G(Dt,Z))
γ−1GZ(Dt,Z).
Note that this spread is a decreasing function of the level of intermediation capital,
Z.T h u s ,ad e c r e a s ei nZ will raise the spread between these two rates. It can also be shown
that a decrease in Z will reduce output and the quantity of intermediated capital, but will
increase the quantity of internally ﬁnanced capital as ﬁrms substitute out of intermediation
into internal ﬁnance. These results are presented in the Appendix.
B. How Much Did Bank Closings Reduce Intermediation Capital?
Our model provides a measure of the banking shock - the loss of intermediation capital
as a consequence of bank closings. Assuming that intermediation capital is in ﬁxed supply
and is bank speciﬁc, the fraction of intermediation capital lost due to bank closings is equal
to the fraction of deposits in suspended/failed banks. This implication follows directly from
the constant returns-to-scale intermediation technology. We therefore infer from the deposit
data presented in Table 6 that bank closings cumulatively reduced intermediation capital
about 8 percent between 1930-32 and about 19 percent between 1930-33.
C. How Much Did the Banking Shock Reduce Output?
We now use our model to evaluate the contribution of this decrease in intermediation
capital to the Depression. Fixing (Kt,D t), the elasticity of output with respect to interme-









The numerator of the right-hand side is the total return to intermediation. Therefore, the
left-hand side of this equation is the intermediation sector’s share of value added. This value-
added share elasticity result is not speciﬁc to our model. In fact, any model with a constant
returns to scale technology for producing ﬁnal goods has the feature that, to a ﬁrst-order
approximation, the elasticity of the ﬁn a lg o o dw i t hr e s p e c tt oa n yi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di se q u a l
to that good’s share of value added.
Banking’s share of value added was about 1 percent in the 1930s. In fact, the value-
added share of the entire ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate sector (FIRE) was only about 13
percent in 1929, and dropped to 11 percent in 1933.28 Note that this value added measure
actually overstates the elasticity, since our model attributes all of banking’s value added to
intermediation capital. Some of this sector’s value-added will be paid to labor, which means
that the elasticity of output with respect to intermediation capital is actually lower than
the share of value added. With this small elasticity, our model predicts that the decrease in
intermediation capital caused by bank closings reduced output less than 1 percent between
1929-33.
Can a Low Substitution Elasticity Plausibly Magnify the Shock?
The macroeconomic eﬀect of destroyed intermediation capital would be larger if bank
ﬁnance and alternative forms of ﬁnance or other inputs were poor substitutes. A low substi-
tution elasticity, however, is inconsistent with the data. If banking shocks were an important
contributing factor to the Depression and this substitution elasticity was very low, the cost
share of banking and of FIRE should have increased considerably during the 1930s. In con-
trast, the cost share of FIRE falls from 13 percent in 1929 to 11 percent in 1933, and banking’s
cost share falls from about 1.4 percent to about 1 percent over the same period.29
28Banking accounted for 10p e r c e n to fv a l u ea d d e di nF I R Ei n1947. Kuznets (1941) reports a similar
number for the period between 1919-1938.
29The data on banking’s cost share is from Kuznets (1941), page 731
28Can Externalities Magnify the Impact of the Shock? Evidence from State-Level
Data
An externality associated with intermediation capital could increase the economic im-
pact of this intermediation shock. One drawback to the externality story is that there are
many diﬀerent ways of putting externalities into models, but often these externalities do
not have strong micro foundations, nor are they straightforward to quantitatively evaluate.
The banking/Depression literature, however, suggests a speciﬁc type of externality that is
straightforward to assess. This literature argues that bank failures reduced output by de-
stroying local bank information, and thus suggests a productive externality associated with
intermediation capital that aﬀects local production. We therefore consider a version of our
model in which there are N regions, and aggregate output is the sum of regional outputs.











i is the productive externality from intermediation capital in region i.T h i sv e r s i o n
of our model predicts that regions that experience many bank closings should also experience
relatively large depressions. We assess this prediction by ﬁrst deﬁning a region as a state
and then computing the correlation between bank suspensions/failures and economic activ-
ity across the 48 U.S. states during the Great Depression. Note that this comparison is a
regional extension of Bernanke’s (1983) inﬂuential paper which found that aggregate bank
suspensions/failures were negatively correlated with aggregate output.
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the sum of suspended/failed deposits from 1929-
33 relative to total deposits in 1929 vs. the percentage change in nominal personal income
between 1929 and 1933 by state. The most striking feature of these data is that the signiﬁcant
negative correlation between bank closings and output documented by Bernanke (1983) at
the aggregate level does not emerge at the state level.30 The plot shows no systematic
relationship between the concentration of banking shocks and the severity of the Depression
across states. The correlation between suspended deposits and nominal income is −0.15 and is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. A regression of the percentage change in personal income
30Temin (1989) also notes that some bank failure episodes were very regionally concentrated.
29divided by the aggregated GDP deﬂator on the fraction of deposits in suspended/failed banks
yields an R2 of 0.014a n das l o p ec o e ﬃc i e n tt h a ti sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.31 We
also examined the relationship between the same measure of deposits and an alternative state-
wide measure of real economic activity - the percentage change in manufacturing employment
between 1929-33.32 Figure 2 shows a scatter plot between these two variables. The correlation
between these data is, in fact, positive, rather than negative: 0.12.33
These data do not support the standard banking story for the Great Depression: that
bank closings reduced output by destroying local information capital. The relatively small
bank shock, combined with banking’s small share in the production function, and the lack
of any correlation between state-level bank closings and economic activity indicate that if
banking was an important contributing factor during the Great Depression, it must have
operated through some alternative mechanism in which the shock was much larger and was
operative at the aggregate level rather than the regional level. We analyze an alternative
mechanism in the following section.
D. Other Shocks to Bank Capacity
An alternative banking story is that depositors were afraid of bank runs and conse-
quently withdrew deposits from all banks. This alternative story would have a better chance
than the bank failure story if the decrease in deposits resulting from depositor fear was sub-
stantially larger than the decrease in deposits at closed banks. This story is diﬃcult to
evaluate, however, because it is unclear how much of the decrease in total deposits was due
to depositor fear and how much was an endogenous response to the large decrease in overall
economic activity. Consequently, we can’t measure the size of this shock associated with
depositor fear.
Despite this measurement problem, our model makes one speciﬁc prediction about
31We estimated two other versions of this equation. To control for level aﬀects, we deﬁned a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if a state’s per-capita income was above the median. We used this dummy variable
to analyze an intercept shift, and an intercept shift and slope coeﬃcient shift. The results were quite similar
to the simpler speciﬁcation.
32These data are from the bi-annual Census of Manufacturers.
33The lack of a systematic pattern between bank closings and economic activity at the state level raises
the possibility that the correlation between aggregate bank closing and aggrgate output may indicate that
aggregate bank closings are proxying for another variable. This is consistent with Green and Whiteman
(1992).
30this story that can be evaluated. According to this story, banking services are in relatively
scarce supply because of deposit withdrawal. The model predicts that an exogenous decrease
in deposits will decrease the deposit/output ratio. This result is not speciﬁct oo u rm o d e l ,
but follows directly from constant returns to scale in production and the relative scarcity
of deposits. The actual deposit/output ratio, however, diﬀers considerably from with this
prediction. Table 6 shows that the deposit/output ratio rises from 0.58 to 0.78 between
1929-32. This increase in the deposit/output ratio implies that deposits were not relatively
scarce during the Great Depression.
Even if deposits were relatively scarce because of depositor fear, however, there is
no theoretical presumption that this would generate a massive depression because banking’s
share of value added is small. In fact, these cost share statistics suggest a presumption that
banking shocks should tend to have small, rather than large macroeconomic eﬀects. The
Irish bank strikes of the 1960s-70s provides evidence that is consistent with this latter view.
Murphy (1978) reports that on three occasions between 1966 and 1976, industrial disputes led
to the shutdown of the Associated Banks, which accounted for over 80 percent of Irish M2.
These strikes, the longest of which was six-months, represent negative, exogenous shocks
to the banking sector that are larger than any plausible bank capacity shock that might
have occurred during the U.S. Great Depression .The macroeconomic eﬀects of these strikes,
however, were small. During the longest strike, detrended retail sales fell about four percent,
and real output rose over the full calendar year of 1970. Murphy argues that the strike did not
have important eﬀects because households and ﬁrms developed substitutes for bank services,
including private trade credit. These “natural experiments” show that a long-term shutdown
of most of a country’s banking system - a shutdown much larger than that which occurred
during the Great Depression - need not substantially reduce economic activity.
These data are inconsistent with the view that the Depression was caused by a large
exogenous decrease in deposits. Instead, they are consistent with the view that the decrease in
deposits may have been primarily an endogenous response to the overall decline in economic
activity.
31E. Other Implications of a Banking Shock
Our analyses of the banking story - through an explicit shock based on bank closings
and through an alternative story based on a decrease in overall bank capacity - do not sup-
port the view that banking was an important contributing factor to the Great Depression.
Of course, any explicit analysis along these lines depends on a deﬁnition and measure of the
banking shock. Some other aspects of the banking story can be assessed without an explicit
deﬁnition and measure of this shock. Our model makes two such predictions. The ﬁrst pre-
diction is that any reduction in banking capacity should increase the spread between deposit
and loan interest rates. The second is that any reduction in the availability of intermediated
loans, or any increase in the cost of intermediated loans, should lead ﬁrms to substitute out
of external ﬁnance and into internal ﬁnance.
Impact of the Banking Shock on the Cost of Intermediation
Our model predicts that a negative shock to the banking sector increases the spread
between the interest rate on intermediated debt and the bank’s cost of funds. Before examin-
ing changes in interest spreads, it is important to recognize that these spreads are aﬀected not
just by intermediation shocks, but also by changes in loan maturity, changes in the compo-
sition of borrowers, and changes in default risk. Since these other factors may have changed
signiﬁcantly during the Great Depression, it is very diﬃcult to separately identify changes in
interest spreads that are due to changes in the intermediationtechnology.
This identiﬁcation problem leads us to make two comparisons of interest rate spreads.
We ﬁrst examine an interest rate spread between a collateralized, short-term obligation and
short-term Treasuries during the Great Depression. This comparison permits us to reasonably
control for some of the other factors aﬀecting interest spreads: both securities have roughly
constant maturities, and the collateralized nature of the private obligation limits the eﬀect
of changes in either default probability or the composition of borrowers.
Our second comparison presents the spread between long-term, quality-rated corpo-
rate securities and government bonds during the Great Depression. This analysis has been
conducted in the previous literature for low quality corporate debt. However, the change in
this low-quality spread cannot be solely attributed to intermediation shocks because default
32risk on these lower quality securities increased during the Great Depression. Consequently,
it is unclear how much of the change in the spread was due to intermediation, and how much
was due to higher default risk. To confront this identiﬁcation problem, we present spreads on
high quality securities whose default risk may not have changed much during the Depression.
If a negative intermediation shock was important, spreads on all types of securities would
be expected to rise in the 1930s. Alternatively, if the spread on low quality debt was higher
largely because of changes in default risk, the spread should be roughly unchanged for the
highest quality securities, but should rise for lower quality securities.
Table 10: Banker’s Acceptance Rates and Government Security Yields34
Year 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
(1) Bankers Acceptances 4.09 5.03 2.48 1.57 1.28 0.63
(2) Short-Term Gov. Debt 3.97 4.42 2.23 1.15 0.78 0.26
(1)-(2) 0.12 0.61 0.25 0.42 0.50 0.37
We ﬁrst analyze our measure of the short-term spread. Table 10 presents the spread
between 3 to 6 month Banker’s acceptances and 3 to 6 month Treasury notes. The Banker’s
acceptances are collateralized, which controls for changes in default risk. Since the bank that
originally discounted the bill stood as the guarantor of its ultimate payment, it is important
to note that the bank performed an important intermediation function in the production
of this asset. Consequently, a negative shock to the intermediation technology should have
increased the spread between these two securities. The table shows that the spread between
the rate on banker’s acceptances and Treasuries does not change much during the Depression.
The stability of this interest rate spread therefore indicates that the eﬃciency of this type of
intermediation was not impaired during the Depression.35
We next examine the spread between the rates on corporate bonds, which are a substi-
tute for bank ﬁnance for large ﬁrms, and U.S. government bonds. Table 11 shows the spread
34The data are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943).
35The gap between commercial loan rates and short term government securities rose about 250 basis points
during the Depression. The gap between commercial loans and government bonds, however, narrowed by
about 120 basis points. Given the caveats mentioned above, plus a steepening in the yield curve, it is not
clear how to interpret these changes.
33for corporate bonds of diﬀerent qualities - Aaa (lowest default risk), Aa, A, and Baa. There
are two striking features of these data. First, the average increase in interest spreads is fairly
small. Second, the magnitude of the increases in the spread is directly related to the quality
of the debt: the average spread changes very little for high quality debt, but increases for
lower quality debt.
Table 11: Interest Rate Spreads Between Corporate and Government Bonds36
Years 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Avg.
Aaa - Gov 1.13 1.26 1.24 1.33 1.18 1.25
Aa - Gov 1.33 1.48 1.71 2.30 1.92 1.85
A- G o v 1.68 1.84 2.67 3.52 2.78 2.70
Baa - Gov 2.30 2.61 4.28 5.62 4.45 4.24
These data are consistent with the view that changes in default risk were an important
contributing factor to higher spreads. To illustrate how these changes could have aﬀected
spreads, suppose that Baa securities pay oﬀ 60 percent of the principal if the ﬁrm defaults.
With this assumption, the 230 basis point spread between Treasuries and Baa bonds in 1929
implies that the default probability for Baa bonds was about 5 percent at that time. It also
implies that the average 424 basis point Baa spread during the Depression can be completely
explained by an increase in this default probability from 5 percent to 8 percent. This increase
does not seem implausible during this period.37
While we cannot draw a ﬁrm conclusion about the quantitative importance of changes
in default risk, it is certainly true that default risk rose during the Depression and thus
contributed to higher spreads. But even if we abstract from default risk and completely
attribute these higher spreads to negative intermediation shocks, it seems unlikely that these
increases - ranging from 12 basis points to 194 basis points - can plausibly explain the Great
Depression. If higher spreads were the key to understanding the Great Depression, they
36The data are from Banking and Monetary Statistics, BoG.
37Cole and Ohanian (2000) present a monthly analysis of these spreads, which permits a closer examination
of changes in spreads with the onset of banking crises. We did not ﬁnd much evidence of large increases in
interest spreads around these periods. .
34should have increased much more during the Depression than during milder recessions. But
this is not the case. The average rise in the Baa-Treasury spread for all post-World War II
recessions is more than 200 basis points. This includes several recessions in the 1970s and
early 1980s in which this spread rose as much as 500 basis points. All of these recessions were
much milder than the Great Depression, despite these much larger interest spread increases.
In summary, interest spreads did not rise much outside of low-quality corporate secu-
rities, and it is unclear how much of this increase is due to intermediation shocks. Moreover,
the average increase in spreads does not seem to be nearly large enough to account for the
magnitude of the Great Depression. In the following section, we present the second prediction
of our model that does not rely on an explicit deﬁnition of the banking shock. Our model
shows that if a negative banking shock increased the cost of funds and disrupted economic
activity, ﬁrms should have increased retained earnings.
Impact of Banking Shocks on Other Sources of Finance.
The theory predicts that a reduction in the availability of intermediated ﬁnance, or an
increase in the cost of intermediated ﬁnance, should lead ﬁrms to substitute out of intermedi-
ated ﬁnance and increase retained earnings. Figures 3 and 4 show real proﬁts, dividends, and
retained earnings per adult relative to trend in the entire corporate sector and in the manu-
facturing subsector, respectively. The most striking feature of these data is that ﬁrms were
not increasing retained earnings as the theory predicts. In sharp contrast, retained earnings
fell substantially as ﬁrms maintained relatively high dividend payments. Corporate proﬁts
fell by nearly 40 percent between 1929 and 1930, but dividend payments fell by only about 4
percent. Proﬁts decreased by over 70 percent between 1929 and 1931, but dividend payments
fell by only 25 percent during this period. By 1932, corporations experienced substantial
losses, but retained earnings fell even more as ﬁrms maintained dividend payments equal to
51 percent of their 1929 level. This pattern also emerges at the sectoral level. Figure 4 shows
that a very similar pattern prevailed among manufacturing corporations, and table 12s h o w s
that this pattern continues among durable and nondurable manufacturers and among mining
corporations.38
38There was some variance in dividend payouts at the industry level. For example, dividends in the
tobacco industry were particularly high during the Depression. These outliers did not aﬀect the sectoral
35The maintenance of dividend payments at the expense of retained earnings throughout
the Depression suggests that ﬁrms were liquidating their enterprises, rather than ﬁnding
substitutes to costly bank ﬁnance. Reconciling this large drop in retained earnings with the
banking story seems diﬃcult. To do so requires explaining why ﬁrms drained their coﬀers
and increased their exposure to negative banking shocks.
Table 12 Proﬁts and Dividends in Key Sectors39
(Real Per Adult and Relative to Trend)
1929 1931 1933
Mining
Proﬁts 430 -75 -115
Dividends 309 118 66
Durable Manufacturing
Proﬁts 2247 -155 -721
Dividends 1335 811 314
Nondurable Manufacturing
Proﬁts 2332 1303 -85
Dividends 1213 1133 803
5. Interactions between the Wage and Banking Shocks
Even though we ﬁnd that neither banking shocks nor wage shocks account for much of
the Great Depression, is it possible that the interaction between these two shocks has a large
macroeconomic eﬀect? There are two reasons why we do not think this is very likely. If there
was an important connection between the two types of shocks, we should observe a strong
negative correlation between the incidence of banking crises and economic activity in sectors
distorted by high wages. Manufacturing was ostensibly distorted by the high wage, but the
level statistics much. Real nondurable manufacturing dividends in 1933 were 66 percent of their 1929 level.
Excluding tobacco, these dividends in 1933 were 62 percent of their 1929 level.
39The data are from the NIPA and are measured without inventory valuation adjustment. We thank Mark
Gertler for pointing out to us that this measure of proﬁts is a better measure of cash ﬂow (net of depreciation).
They are detrended at the average rate of growth of output per adult: 1.9%.
36correlation between manufacturing employment and bank closings was positive at the state
level, rather than negative. Moreover, the correlation between state per-capita income and
bank failures in states with large manufacturing sectors - those with above-median ratios of
manufacturing employment to population - is roughly the same as that for all the states, and
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
There are also theoretical reasons for doubting that an interaction between the two
shocks would have large eﬀects. To illustrate this point, consider the simplest possible method
of incorporating the banking shock into the wage model. Suppose that intermediation capital
was another input into production, and denote the sectoral level of intermediation capital




where θ is unchanged and γ =0 .01 to match banking’s value-added share. Given this
speciﬁcation, it is straightforward to show that the 18 percent decrease in Z that occurred
between 1929-33 would reduce output in the wage model an additional 0.18p e r c e n t . T h i s
result partially reﬂects the fact that the decrease in intermediation capital leads to general
equilibrium changes in factor prices that moderate the impact of the factor change.
6. What Else was Diﬀerent about the Great Depression?
The two candidate shocks we have considered - bank failures and imperfectly ﬂexible
wages - don’t seem capable of plausibly explaining the Great Depression. So if it wasn’t
banking or wages, what other factors might have been responsible?40
A. Lower Asset Prices
The ﬁrst alternative shock we examine is lower asset prices. The stock market crash
of 1929 is considered by some economists to have contributed to the Great Depression (see
Romer (1993)). It is diﬃcult to evaluate this story since there currently is no generally
accepted theory of asset price ﬂuctuations. Without such a theory, one cannot establish that
asset price changes contributed signiﬁcantly to the Great Depression.41 But we can take a
40One diﬀerence between these two episodes is that the deﬂation of 1921-22 immediately followed a signiﬁ-
cant inﬂation, while the deﬂation of 1929-33 followed a period of roughly stable prices. If nominal prices were
more ﬂexible during the earlier depression, the deﬂation may have had smaller real eﬀects. Little is known,
however, about the diﬀerences in price ﬂexibility during these two downturns.
41Without a good theory of asset price ﬂuctuations, it is unclear what shock drove down asset prices, or
how asset prices interacted..
37ﬁrst step by empirically assessing whether other periods of large and prolonged decreases in
asset prices also coincide with major Depressions. One of the best known of these episodes
is Japan in the 1990s. We therefore compare changes in stock prices and output in the U.S.
in the 1930s to Japan in the 1990s. Tables 13-14 show real stock prices and output for these
two countries. We ﬁnd some important similarities in asset price changes between the two
countries, but very diﬀerent output changes after share prices fall.
Table 13: Real U.S. Detrended Stock Prices and Output42
(1929=100)
Year 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
S&P Index 50.4 61.7 78.2 100.0 81.4 57.1 31.6
Output Index 102.8 100.1 97.7 100.0 86.9 77.6 64.0
Table 14: Real Japanese Detrended Stock Prices and Output43
(1989=100)
Year 1986 1989 1990 1991 1992
Nikkei Index 55.1 100.0 81.6 63.1 44.6
Output Index 96.2 100.0 101.4 101.5 98.9
Stock prices in both countries roughly doubled during the three-year period before
their respective market peaks. Output growth relative to respective trends is also very similar
in the two countries during these three-year periods of rising stock prices. Following their
respective market peaks, stock prices fall sharply in both countries. U.S. share prices fall
about 68 percent, and Japanese share prices fall about 55 percent. Despite these similar stock
price patterns, output growth diﬀers substantially after prices begin to fall. U.S. output is 36
42Source of S&P data: Historical Statistics table X 492-498
43Quantities are not per adult, and have been detrended using a 3.7% rate of growth which is the average
rate of growth of real output between 1979-89. Output and Stock Price data are from the DRI International
Database.
38percent below trend three years after its stock market peak, while Japanese output remains
on trend three years after its stock market peak.44
These data show that large asset price decreases are not always associated with big
depressions. Japanese stock prices fell nearly as much in the 1990s as U.S. share prices fell
in the 1930s, but Japanese output remained close to trend while stock prices fell.45 These
Japanese data and the pattern of retained earnings during the U.S. Great Depression raise
questions about the asset price story. First, if lower asset prices contributed to the U.S. Great
Depression, why didn’t a similar decrease produce a Great Depression in Japan? Second, if
the macroeconomic impact of lower prices is through lower borrower net worth, as is often
presumed in the literature, then why did ﬁrms continue to pay such dividends during the
1930s rather than increase retained earnings? Finally, if decreases in asset values have a
substantial negative eﬀe c to no u t p u t ,t h r o u g he i t h e rb o r r o w e ro rc o n s u m e rn e tw o r t h ,t h e n
w h yd i dt h ei n c r e a s ei na s s e tp r i c e sh a v es ol i t t l ee ﬀect in either Japan or the U.S.? Any
theory of the Depression based on lower asset values should be able to explain why lower
asset prices don’t always produce major depressions, and explain why retained earnings fell
in the 1930s.46
B. The Fall in Total Factor Productivity
The second alternative shock we consider is a total factor productivity (TFP) shock.
This shock is much diﬀerent during the Great Depression than other periods and in particular
diﬀers sharply from 1921-22. TFP rose about 5 percent relative to trend in 1921, but fell
44Japan did experience a growth slowndown after 1991,a n db y1998 was 15% below trend. However, note
that this decrease comes 9 years after the decrease in asset prices.
45Land values in Japan also followed the same rollercoaster pattern as stock prices in the 1990s. Commer-
cial real estate values doubled during the same period that stock prices doubled, and fell 35 percent three
years after the market peak. These data are thus inconsistent with the view that Japan maintained high
macroeconomic activity because other asset values remained high.
(See commercial real estate prices in the 6 largest cities from the Japan Real Estate Institute:
http://www.reinet.or.jp/index-e.htm.)
46These data cast doubt on the ability of theoretical models in which ﬁnanical market imperfections amplify
the eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks by reducing net worth being able to explain a signiﬁcant portion of the
Great Depression. (See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000) (BGG)).
According to these models, output should have expanded signiﬁcantly when stock prices were rising. Moreover,
these models predict that enterprises should have substantially increased internal cash when share prices began
falling. Both of these predictions stand in contrast to the data.
39about 14 percent below trend between 1929 and 1933.47
It is unlikely that this TFP decrease during the Great Depression reﬂects technological
regress or is solely due to factor measurement error. To see this latter point, consider three
types of measurement error: capital utilization, changes in labor quality, and changes in
capital quality. The utilization of the capital stock was low during the Great Depression, and
this overstatement of the capital input will bias down TFP measurement. But the other two
sources of factor mismeasurement will tend to oﬀset mismeasured capital input. The average
quality of labor input probably rose during the Depression, as the least productive workers
were probably the ﬁrst to be laid oﬀ. This indicates that measures of labor input based on
employment or hours worked will understate labor input in eﬃciency units. Similarly, the
oldest, least eﬃcient capital was idled during the Depression (Bresnahan and Raﬀ (1991)).
This “vintage eﬀect” implies that measures of capital input based on the number of idle
factories will understate capital input in eﬃciency units. Both of these compositional eﬀects
will tend to understate the true decline in TFP and tend to oﬀset the impact of capital
utilization.
Since labor’s share is about twice as large as capital’s share, considerable mismeasure-
ment of capital utilization is required to bias the TFP measure. For example, if true capital
input was 20 percent lower than measured capital input (after correcting for vintage eﬀects),
and true labor input in eﬃciency units was 5 percent higher than measured labor input due
to compositional shifts, TFP would have decreased by 11 percent, compared to the measured
decrease of 14 percent.
Negative productivity shocks also show up in disaggregated data. Bernanke and
Parkinson (1991) report negative productivity shocks in manufacturing and argue that the
shocks reﬂect labor hoarding or increasing returns to scale. But there are good reasons to
question these two explanations. Recent research indicates constant returns to scale in man-
ufacturing, rather than increasing returns. And at least the traditional reason given for labor
hoarding - the costs of laying oﬀ and subsequently rehiring a worker exceeds the cost of
retaining the worker- seems unlikely during this period. Managers seem to have been liqui-
47Romer (1988) argues that there was a favorable supply shock during the 1921-22 depression, although
she does not discuss TFP changes.
40dating their enterprises during the Great Depression, rather than planning for an upcoming
expansion that would have productively utilized the hoarded labor.
The TFP decrease may not be adequately explained by technological regress, factor
mismeasurement, or returns to scale. More research is needed to determine the sources of
and reasons for, this large change and how much it may have contributed to the Great
Depression. Since a decrease in productivity reduces marginal productivity, this shock may
represent the best chance for the wage hypothesis to account for a reasonable fraction of the
output decrease.
7. Summary and Conclusion
Our results suggest that two popular stories for the Great Depression - the inﬂexible
wage/deﬂation story and the banking shock story - account for a relatively small fraction
of the output fall that occurred between 1929-33. The problem with the inﬂexible wage
story does is that measured wages were above trend in only a subset of the economy, and
that a reasonable correction for shifts in the composition of employment would reduce those
wage measures below trend. The problem with the banking shock story is that the shock is
small, and the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to a banking shock is also small.
Moreover three important auxiliary predictions of the banking story don’t line up with the
data. The theory predicts that states that had worse banking crises should have had more
worse depressions. But there is no systematic relationship between state economic activity
and the number of bank closings. The theory also predicts that ﬁrms should have increased
internal cash in response to the banking shock. In contrast, ﬁrms reduced retained earn-
ings substantially during the Great Depression. The theory also predicts that the ratio of
bank deposits to output should have decreased during the Depression. This ratio increases
substantially during the Depression. Any successful ﬁnancial intermediation theory of the
Depression should be consistent with these three facts.
We conclude that the Great Depression remains a puzzle. The paper suggests two
directions for future research. One direction is to analyze money/deﬂation shocks through
alternative channels. The second direction is to analyze real shocks. The fact that real output
per adult fell 13p e r c e n ti n1930 without any signiﬁcant deﬂation suggests the possibility that
41a real shock contributed to the initial downturn. And the large decrease in TFP suggests the
possibility that some shock may have aﬀected productivity during the Great Depression.
428. Appendix: Characterizing the Equilibrium of the Wage Model
In what follows, we will assume that the diﬀerence in the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks is small enough that the nonnegativity constraint on retained earnings never binds.













where µt, λt, and ξt,i are the Lagrangian multipliers on the constraints (9) and (10) and the
nonnegativity constraints on xi, respectively.
It is easy to see from the f.o.c. on plant capital, (15), that K1 = K2. Hence we can
aggregate plant capital and treat them as the state variables (K,D), where K/2 is plant
capital. It is easy to see that xl cannot be positive, since condition (14) would imply that xh
was also positive, and hence at both plants the marginal product of capital would be greater
than λt−1, which would contradict (15).









γ−1G1(D,Z) ≤ 1, with strict equality if D>0, (18)









γ − (K + D).
We can develop the analysis further by assuming an explicit functional form for G.
The Leontieﬀ speciﬁcation allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for the variables D and
K:
G(D,Z)=m i n ( αD,Z),
where α < 1 and (1 − α)D is the cost of intermediation.


























If the value of D implied by (19) is negative, then it is easy to show that in the steady state









If the value of D implied by (19) is greater than Z/α, then in the steady state D = Z and K
is the solution to (17) when we set G(D,Z)=Z.
This allows us to conduct some comparative statics on what happens to K and D
when intermediation capital changes. If Z binds, then dK/dZ < 0 and d(K + αD)/dZ > 0.
Furthermore, if D>0, then d(αD)/dα > 0, and hence dK/dα < 0, while d(K+αD)/dα > 0.
Our model predicts that a decrease in intermediation capital increases internally installed
capital, but signiﬁcantly reduces intermediated investment. Similarly, an increase in the
cost of intermediation (α) increases internally installed capital and reduces intermediated
investment. It is also easy to see how the spread in the lending and borrowing rate is aﬀected




The interest rate on savings must be
1+rs = γAεh(K/2+αD)
γ−1α.
This implies that the spread between these two rates is given by
rb − rs = γAεh(K/2+αD)
γ−1(1 − α).
A decrease in intermediation capital that binds will lower the quantity of intermediated
capital, αD, and raise the quantity ﬁnanced out of retained earnings, K. It also raises both
44the borrowing and lending interest rates and the spread between them, since the marginal
productivity of capital at the high productivity plant is raised. The spread also is decreasing
in α, which governs the fraction of capital consumed by the intermediation process.
Finally, assume that GD,G Z,G DZ > 0 for all D,Z > 0. In this case, a reduction in Z
works like an increase in intermediation costs. Since G is CRS, G(D,Z)=g(Z/D)D, where
g0 > 0. In response to a decrease in Z, the equilibrium level of Z/D would increase. This
indicates that the relevant factor for intermediation costs is not the level of intermediation
capital per se, but the level relative to the quantity of intermediated capital.
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49Figure 1: Personal Income vs Suspensions
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3Figure 2: Manufacturing Workers vs Bank Suspensions 
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3Figure 3: Domestic Industries: 
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